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Discussant's Response to 
"On the Economics of  Product 
Differentiation  in Auditing" 
Howard R. Osharow 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Good afternoon  ladies and gentlemen. First let me express my appreciation 
to the Symposium organizers for  inviting me to start the discussion of  such a 
difficult  topic as product differentiation  in auditing. I also want to express my 
appreciation to Dan and his coauthor for  making this such a challenging 
opportunity. It has been a long time since I have thought of  differentiation  in 
auditing in terms of  formulas  like they use. While I have used some advanced 
mathematical techniques such as regression analysis to determine the reason-
ableness of  inventory levels for  a chain of  400 drugstores, it has been many 
years since I have had to deal with sentences like "Given P', and a loss from 
Type I error, all assessed by the user, an optimum audit intensity, N*, can be 
calculated by performing  a Bayesian preposterior analysis." 
Many of  you are familiar  with the television program Star Trek. I want to 
tell you that after  reading the paper several times I could finally  sympathize 
with Dr. McCoy of  the Starship Enterprise every time he had to try to treat an 
injury to Mr. Spock. Dr. McCoy was a very talented physician, but Mr. Spock 
was a rather unusual character. While, other than his famous  ears, he looked 
human, we know his blood was green and his heart was where your liver might 
be. His various other physical differences  from  a normal human being made him 
quite a challenge to the doctor. I almost feel  like I am playing Dr. McCoy to the 
paper's Mr. Spock. 
In spite of  these deficiencies  in my upbringing, I am going to try to give you 
what I believe is a practitioner's view on product differentiation  in auditing, with 
particular emphasis on the definition  of  the product itself.  Unfortunately,  time 
did not permit me to discuss the contents of  the paper with Dan prior to this 
meeting. If  I had, some of  my comments and questions might be unnecessary. 
But, since our purpose here is to generate a discussion of  the paper and its 
applicability to the world of  auditing, I guess we will still be able to meet our 
objectives. 
We should recognize that the academician and the practitioner tend to come 
at any problem from  different  perspectives. To paraphrase what they say about 
the English and the Americans, academics and practitioners are two profes-
sions separated by a common interest. I have personally found  trying to read 
and understand most academic papers to be an extremely frustrating  experi-
ence, especially when the topic seems to have applicability to what I am 
interested in, but the content leaves me absolutely dumbfounded.  I have been 
heading our firm's  audit research and development efforts  for  the last three 
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years, and have found  very few  academics that I can discuss audit methodology 
with who speak a language that I am capable of  understanding or applying to our 
practice. Maybe that is a deficiency  on my part, but perhaps it is just 
symptomatic of  the different  backgrounds and perspectives of  the academician 
and the practitioner. I do wish there was a more coordinated effort  between the 
academic and practice sides of  our common interests that could make much of 
the research more valuable to the practitioner. 
Let me start the discussion of  the paper by presenting what I call the 
Auditor's Dilemma of  Interests. The auditor, as we are all painfully  aware, 
really has at least two parties interested in the nature of  his services. One of 
these parties is the client, or client management, that engages the auditor to 
report on financial  statements or render other services as may be required. 
The other is the public that looks to the auditor as a "guardian of  the public 
interest.'' Our discussion earlier this morning on the legal liability of  account-
ants touched heavily on this matter. 
One of  my concerns about the paper is that I believe it tends to deal 
unrealistically with the public's attitude toward the auditor and the auditor's 
responsibilities and thus glosses over a major problem of  our time. That 
problem is that the public does not assess ex ante and ex post probabilities in 
determining whether, when there has been a business failure,  they should try 
to sue the auditor. Let us be realistic about it. When a business fails,  investors 
have very few  sources to look to for  recovery of  their funds.  A legal system 
such as we have in the United States tends to make it easy for  an investor to 
look for  someone associated with the company who has funds  to become a 
target of  litigation to recover the lost investment. I do not want to discuss the 
U.S. legal system, but I believe it is unrealistic to say that, in the real world, 
only mismatches between the public's expectation of  an auditor and the 
auditor's actual performance  on the engagement will result in "hits" as they 
are called in the paper. I believe that, in spite of  what the profession  would like, 
the public does perceive the auditor as an insurer of  its investment and 
someone who has the responsibility to signal when that investment might be 
turning sour. 
I believe this has serious implications to the differentiation  model when you 
balance it against the clients who engage the auditor. These clients have 
interests, too. The paper implies that the client (meaning top management of 
the client) will always take the position on issues that will most favorably  reflect 
management's wishes as to the outcome of  the issue. It almost, but not 
directly, implies that management will always select a course of  action that is 
opposite the interest of  the public when it comes to reporting bad news. While I 
am sure that such cases do exist, I do not believe it is always the case. 
Management is not stupid and it does not like to have the auditors waving red 
flags  in front  of  the bull. Neither management nor the auditor would like to see 
an auditor's disclosure become a self-fulfilling  prophesy. Therefore,  it is up to 
the auditor and the client together to agree that the public interest has been 
served without destroying the whole economic system because of  incomplete 
and imperfect  information. 
Thus the auditor's dilemma . . . how does he serve the interests of  the 
client and the public at the same time while serving the other interest which 
thus far  has not been mentioned, that is, the self-interest  of  the auditor in 
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practice? I believe this is where the issue of  differentiation  comes into play. It 
also means it is time that I focused  on a definition  of  the product that the auditor 
produces. 
I believe that the product differs  depending upon your point of  view. For the 
public, the product is the auditor's report, and I agree with most of  the material 
in the paper that tends to indicate that the public's only means of  assessing the 
quality of  that report is by the reputation, or at least the public's perception of 
the reputation, of  the auditor involved, versus the reputation of  auditors as a 
whole. Of  course, the public is working with imperfect  information,  because 
even two audit reports signed by the same firm  do not necessarily carry the 
same amount of  real quality with them. Auditing firms  consist of  people, and 
people do not always react the same way in the face  of  similar information.  So 
while the general marketing of  a firm's  name in the public eye is important, I 
believe it is only important from  that standpoint, that is, a marketing 
standpoint. 
The real key to differentiation  is to understand that the product the auditor 
delivers to the client and client management is not the auditor's report. It is the 
whole relationship of  the auditor with the client. It is the auditor understanding 
what the client expects of  him and what is important to that client, and then 
delivering against those measured objectives. 
Differentiation  takes on another aspect also. It's a different  perspective that 
the potential client or client has on an auditing firm  depending upon whether 
they are an incumbent firm  or whether the company is involved in investigating 
the engagement of  new or different  auditors. It is much easier for  a firm  to 
differentiate  itself  in the mind of  its client when it has been the firm's  auditor for 
a few  years. The incumbent auditing firm  knows the client, its strengths and 
weaknesses, and has hopefully  identified  any "hot points." The rest of  the 
auditing firms  represent a vague world to the client. I think that we have found 
that the only real way to begin to tickle a potential client's fancy  for  selecting 
you as their auditors is to have developed a personal relationship, through 
outside activities or otherwise, with top management of  the potential client. 
This is why accounting firms  devote so much time, effort  and expense to the 
outside activities of  their partners. An accounting firm  cannot differentiate  itself 
through its audit process nor through anything else that another firm  can 
duplicate. What those other firms  cannot duplicate are its individual people and 
the impressions those people leave in the minds of  the clients they serve and 
the potential clients they contact. 
Unfortunately,  there is not sufficient  time today to provide a detailed 
discussion of  client values, but let me conclude this section of  my discussion 
with a comment: the auditor that does not respond to the client's values, and 
indeed respond to the client's highest value, will be unsuccessful  in attempting 
to differentiate  himself  through any of  the tools that he uses on the audit. I 
would propose that the client does not know nor does the client care about the 
audit process. He does not care if  the auditor uses a microcomputer, has a 
pyramid of  six to one or ten to one, or uses yellow or green paper. What he 
does care about is that he has a good working relationship with an audit partner 
who really understands his company. That understanding can be demonstrated 
by being responsive to the company's needs, understanding the company's 
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operations, organization, terminology and management style, and delivering 
the audit in an efficient  manner. 
Let me make one more point about responding to client values and 
differentiation.  Good performance  in a client value area by the practitioner is 
usually not sufficient  to satisfactorily  transfer  the differentiation  impression to 
the client's mind. The auditor's exemplary performance  in meeting the client's 
values must be adequately communicated  so the client is fully  aware of  the 
auditor's accomplishments and his efforts  to satisfy  the client's needs. 
Remember that attempts at differentiation  amongst auditing firms  is irrelevant if 
buyers of  the firms'  services cannot distinguish the differentiating  factors.  The 
auditing firm  must transfer  the differentiation  knowledge to the client and be 
sure the client acknowledges and is aware of  the factors  involved. Again, this is 
much easier for  the incumbent firm  to do than for  a potential auditing firm.  In a 
proposal situation, the client must look to criteria that are indicative of  future 
performance,  such as reputation, industry experience and apparent business 
sense. This is the best alternative available since the client has no actual 
experience working with the firms  being evaluated, except for  the limited 
exposure obtained during the proposal process and any prior personal rela-
tionship with the firm's  personnel. 
In the short time I have, it is not possible to discuss all aspects of  the paper, 
but let me talk about some points that are of  the most concern to me. On page 
100, the authors conclude that "the higher the fixed  cost commitment, the less 
flexible  the firm  will be in producing a variety of  characteristic vectors." It 
implies that a firm  is less flexible  in meeting the real needs of  its client and its 
public if  it has more structure to its audit process than another firm.  I do not 
believe this is necessarily true. I believe it depends on the nature of  the 
structure imposed into the process. If  those things that are required to be done 
on every audit, regardless of  the shape or size of  the company, can somehow 
be put into a structure so they can be dealt with more efficiently,  I believe this 
gives the structured firm  the advantage over one with less structure. Structure 
does not always have to be viewed in a negative sense. In fact,  if  the firm  can 
put positive structure into the process, it could actually spend more time doing 
a better job responding to the client's real values and not have to spend 
significant  amounts of  time dealing with constant elements. If  the auditor can 
spend less time on the audit process, of  which his client and the public care 
very little, more time is available for  responding to that client's real values 
which will differentiate  the auditor in the client's eyes. 
Let me come to the item in the paper that has given me the most trouble. A 
conclusion in the paper states: "A ranking of  audit firms  on a credibility 
dimension has no pejorative implications." Now, to tell you the truth, the first 
thing I had to do with that conclusion was look up the meaning of  "pejorative" 
in the dictionary. And Webster's  tells me that means "having negative connota-
tions." What that conclusion says to me is that, if  an auditor has a name which is 
associated with a low credibility level as far  as the public is concerned, that does 
not have any significant  implications to that auditor. I may have interpreted the 
meaning of  that conclusion wrong, but if  I have not, I find  it very difficult  to 
understand. I cannot understand how you can have a negative reputation in the 
business community as to the quality of  the intrinsic value of  your report versus 
someone else's report and it not have implications for  your practice or your 
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relationship with your client. During our discussion period, perhaps we can 
explore whether I have interpreted the conclusion properly and what the 
implications are for  actions that an accounting firm  might take in establishing its 
reputation. 
Finally, let me summarize my comments by putting differentiation  in what I 
think is its proper context in the entire auditing process. The auditing firm 
which does the best job of  balancing the three factors  that must be considered 
when providing service to clients—management of  risk, efficient  conduct and 
reporting of  the audit, and delivering values that are held in the highest regard 
by that client—is the auditing firm  that, in the long run, will be able to 
differentiate  itself  from  its competition. This differentiation  involves hiring the 
right people and training those people in both the art of  auditing and effective 
communication. 
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